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Abstract We empirically test if household wealth in-
equality affects borrowing constraints of young entre-
preneurs.We construct a measure of wealth inequality at
the US county level based on the distribution of finan-
cial rents in 2004. We find that in more unequal areas,
entrepreneurs are less likely to apply for a loan fearing
that their applications will be turned down and they use
more of their own funds to finance their ventures. In
more unequal areas, the number of bank establishments
per capita is lower, this effect being stronger during the
2007–2008 financial crisis.
Keywords Wealth inequality . Entrepreneurship .
Financial constraints
JEL classification D31 . G3 . L26
1 Introduction
Entrepreneurs are central in the process of economic
growth. Entrepreneurial activities spur capital forma-
tion, generate technological progress, and create em-
ployment. To perform their tasks, entrepreneurs need
financial resources that they usually do not have when
they intend to start their business. In theory, capital
markets should provide the means to finance profitable
business projects. However, an important area of re-
search has shown that in many occasions, entrepreneurs
face financial constraints, that is, financiers are unwill-
ing or unable to provide funding to positive net present
value projects (see Kerr and Nanda (2009) for a review).
Various studies have identified poor legislation, adverse
local or national culture, and weak institutions amongst
the possible causes of entrepreneurs’ inability to raise
finance.
In this paper, we examine the role of another possible
determinant of entrepreneurial financial constraints:
wealth inequality. In many instances, wealth inequality
has been linked to bad economic outcomes. Engerman
and Sokoloff (2002), for example, describe howwealthy
elites may prevent the development of important insti-
tutions that foster economic growth to keep their hold on
power: Capital markets are one of these important
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institutions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in coun-
tries with a large inequality in wealth, for example
Latin America, banks mostly serve the needs of few
industrial groups owned by wealthy families. They are
less concerned of providing funds to the middle class in
the form of, amongst others, supporting young entrepre-
neurs and small/medium enterprises (see Hoffman et al.
(2007), p. 92).
Following Braggion et al. (2016), our study will link
the degree of wealth inequality in US counties to various
measures of entrepreneurs’ financial constraints. We
will also see whether inequality affected differently
entrepreneurs’ financial constraints before and after the
2007–2008 financial crisis. The USA is a country where
capital markets have been considered most efficient and
where access to finance should be the easiest (Rajan and
Zingales 1998). Any result we may find here could be
considered a lower bound of what we would find in any
other environment.
We base our analysis on the Kauffman Firm Survey.
Amongst various data items, the survey explicitly asks
entrepreneurs whether they expect troubles in raising
finance. In particular, the Survey reports whether entre-
preneurs do not apply for a loan to a financial institution,
even if they need financing, fearing that their application
will be turned down. We will investigate whether entre-
preneurs located in more unequal areas are more likely
to renounce to a loan application. We also corroborate
our findings by looking at the proportion of owners’
equity (i.e. entrepreneurs’ own resources) to firm total
financing. Everything else equal, we should expect that
tighter financial constraints should induce entrepreneurs
to use a larger proportion of their own funds to finance
the venture.
In the second part of our study, we will relate wealth
inequality to a proxy of local supply of bank finance.
Like in Braggion et al. (2016), we measure local supply
of bank finance with the number of bank establishments
formation. Differently from Braggion et al. (2016), we
will also analyze the relationship between inequality and
the number of bank establishments per capita during the
2007–2008 financial crisis.
The empirical methodology in this paper is based on
Braggion et al. (2016). As in that paper, we proxy wealth
inequality with a measure that relies on the amounts of
dividends and interests earned by US households in
2004 (the first year for which these data are available)
as reported by Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Statistics
of Income (IRS-SOI) data. The IRS-SOI data report the
total amount of dividends and interest income received
by US households in each postal zip code. Under the
assumption that a typical household holds the market
index for stocks and bonds, the amount of financial rents
it receives depends only on the quantity of stocks and
bonds it holds—in other words, by the total amount of
financial wealth it owns.
Naturally, local wealth inequality could be correlated
with factors that may directly affect the probability of
entrepreneurs to access external finance.We address this
issue in two ways. First, by using county level data, we
can control for State level unobserved variables that
could be correlated with the local level of inequality.
Second, we rely on the historical literature and instru-
ment our measure of local wealth inequality with vari-
ables related to the local weather pattern. As indicated
by Engerman and Sokoloff (2002), local weather con-
ditions may generate different patterns of inequality by
sustaining different types of crops that display different
fixed costs.
In our analysis, we find that, when we instrument the
wealth inequality measure, in more unequal areas, en-
trepreneurs are less likely to apply for a loan as they fear
to be turned down. This effect is both statistically and
economically significant, a standard deviation increase
in local wealth inequality increases this probability by
73%. Similarly, in more unequal counties, entrepreneurs
rely more on their equity to set up their business. The
effect is also economically meaningful. A standard de-
viation increase in wealth inequality increases the pro-
portion of owners’ equity to total finance with 33%,
evaluated at the mean of the dependent variable. We
find that these effects are concentrated in the pre-2008
period, after the financial crisis inequality does not have
a statistically significant effect on entrepreneurs’ access
to finance. We interpret these results as evidence that
banks cut credit across the board without distinguishing
amongst entrepreneurs located in different areas.
Looking at the aggregate figures, however, we find that
in more unequal counties, the number of banking estab-
lishment per capita becomes lower after 2008, suggest-
ing that, following the crisis, banks retreated from areas
where wealth inequality is higher. The relationship be-
tween bank establishments per capita and local wealth
inequality is between 2 and 10% stronger during the
2007–2008 financial crisis. While the first part of our
analysis shows that during the crisis, banks cut credit
equally to every entrepreneur, and the second part sug-
gests that banks were more likely to fail and divest in
Braggion et al.
areas with higher wealth inequality. The first part of the
analysis lends support to the notion that the crisis
corresponded to a generalized credit crunch to entrepre-
neurial activities. In the second part, we show some
novel evidence that the investment in Bbanking
infrastructure^ declined more in unequal counties. The
latter effect suggests that the crisis may have longer
lasting effects in unequal areas.
Overall, these results support the notion that wealth
inequality is a relevant factor in explaining financial
constraints of entrepreneurs. Our paper contributes to
the large literature that identifies the determinants of
financial constraints on firms and startups. Starting
from King and Levine (1993) and Levine and Zervos
(1998), we know that size and the depth of financial
markets are positively related to economic growth. An-
other set of analyses have linked the development of
capital markets to entrepreneurship. Black and Strahan
(2002), Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), and Kerr and
Nanda (2009), for instance, find large increases in
startup activity subsequent to the US inter-state branch
banking deregulation. Fisman and Love (2004) show
that startup firms struggle with overcoming weaknesses
in financial market development. Comin and Nanda
(2014) show that difficulties faced by startups in raising
capital might negatively affect the commercialization of
new technologies.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses
the theoretical frameworks, the relationships between
wealth inequality and finance and our empirical strategy.
Section 3 describes the data sources. Section 4 presents
our results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Background and empirical methods
As in Braggion et al. (2016), our hypotheses are based
on the work of Engerman and Sokoloff (1997),
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002), Glaeser et al. (2003),
and Sonin (2003). These papers describe how the emer-
gence of wealthy elites may prevent the development of
institutions designed to preserve their political power
and to maintain the existing level of inequality. As a
result, unequal societies will be characterized by,
amongst other things, a less effective educational sys-
tem, a poor judiciary and—especially important for
us—less efficient capital markets.
Anecdotal and historical evidence, as well as formal
econometric works, support the notion that higher
wealth inequality may prevent a sound development of
a financial system. In especially unequal countries,
banks appear to be designed to serve the interests of
large industrial groups owned by wealthy families
(Hoffman et al. 2007, p. 92). In Porfirian Mexico, for
instance, the banking sector was designed to have the
powerful elites to support the dictatorship. Wealthy
families became shareholders of the largest banks in
the country. Large returns to their investment were as-
sured by granting monopoly powers, legal privileges,
and a set of tax exemptions to the same banks (Calomiris
and Haber 2014, pp. 340–347). In Brazil, banks histor-
ically have been a tool to extract inflation tax from the
poor and the middle class as the State did not have
neither the willingness nor the power to impose to the
wealthy the payment of an income tax (Calomiris and
Haber 2014, pp. 399–402). These historical accounts are
also corroborated by econometric evidence. For in-
stance, Morck et al. (2011) observe a less efficient
allocation of capital in countries whose banking systems
are controlled by wealthy families. Moreover, family
control of banks also appears to be related with slower
economic growth and greater financial instability. Rajan
and Ramcharan (2011), using data from the 1930s, show
that US counties with more land inequality had less
banks establishment per capita. They interpret this as
evidence of an underdevelopment of the financial
markets and undersupply of credit. Amongst other
things, Braggion et al. (2016) find similar results using
contemporary US data and a measure of local wealth
inequality based on the distribution of financial rents.
Engerman and Sokoloff also describe the factors that
can be underlying persistent differences in inequality:
different climates and geographical environments that
may favor one type of crop over another. Their argument
suggests that climates that are best suited for large
plantations, like sugar or tobacco, will induce relatively
high economic inequality. The production of these crops
comes at a high fixed cost; as a result, the market, in
equilibrium, can support only a few farms. The outcome
is thus a society controlled by few wealthy landowners.
Climates suitable for crops like tobacco and cotton are
characterized by higher and steadier temperatures and
more rainfalls per year. Conversely, climates supporting
crops like wheat will result in a more equal society. The
production of these crops does not require high fixed
costs; hence, the market can Bbear^ more producers.
These societies will be more equal and mainly com-
posed of small landowners. Climates supporting these
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crops have lower and more variable temperatures, as
well as less (and more variable) rainfalls during the year.
An additional feature of this theoretical framework is
that inequality and Bbad^ institutions will be persistent
over time and reinforce each other. Along these lines,
Rajan (2009) provides a theoretical framework and em-
pirical evidence of how institutions may persist through-
out time.
We will combine these insights in our empirical
analysis and instrument our measure of wealth inequal-
ity with the secular pattern of rainfall and temperature in
various US areas. In our first-stage regressions, we
expect that areas with higher temperature and more
rainfalls will display higher wealth inequality. Similarly,
areas with steadier temperature and steadier rainfalls
should also have higher wealth inequality.
Various works have shown that this sets of instru-
ments are unlikely to violate the exclusion restrictions,
that is, they are more likely to proxy factors related to
the quality of the local institutional environment,
amongst them the supply of finance. Rajan and
Ramcharan (2011), for instance, provide evidence sug-
gesting that the type of weather in US counties is unre-
lated with entrepreneurs’ demand of finance.
Importantly for our analysis, the type of weather can
vary quite significantly within states and across different
counties. In Kansas and Texas, for instance, some
counties experience a yearly rainfall average of 20 in,
while others exceed 40 in. A bit less extreme but still
important are the differences in Illinois, where some
counties have an average rainfall of 28 in, while others
have 30% more (approximately 36 in.). Similarly, in
California, some counties had an average temperature
of 50 F, while others have an average of 64 F. Rajan and
Ramcharan (2011) and Vollrath (2013) provide similar
evidence (see also Braggion et al. 2016).
In our main analysis, we will estimate the relation-
ship between wealth inequality and measures of
financial constraints. In particular, we will estimate the
following equation:
Y i; j;t ¼ αþ αs þ αInd þ αt þ βWealth Inequality j
þ Controls j;t−1 þ εi;t
where Yi,j,t indicates different financial constraints
variables of startup i located in county j at year t. As
we have firm-level data, we additionally control for
industry fixed effects together with the state and year
fixed effects. Controls capture two sets of county and
firm characteristics. In many specifications, we will
instrument local wealth inequality with the local secular
pattern of rainfall and temperature.
In the second part of the analysis, we will check the
relationship between local inequality and local supply of
finance measured by the number of bank establishments
per capita.
We will especially analyze whether the impact of
inequality on the local supply of finance is stronger after
the 2007–2008 financial crisis. The financial crisis led
banks to freeze their lending and possibly generate a
tightening of financial constraints to entrepreneurs:
Y j;t ¼ αþ αs þ αt þ βWealth Inequality j
þ γSubPrime Crisis*Wealth Inequality j
þ Controls j;t−1 þ ε j;t
Post is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for
the years following 2007 and 0 otherwise. The interac-
tion term SubPrime Crisis*Wealth Inequality captures
the differential effect of wealth inequality in the after-
math of the financial crisis.
3 Data
3.1 Data sources
Our main data source is the Kauffman Firm Survey
(KFS) panel dataset. From the KFS, we extract the
financial information for an 8-year period from 2004
up to (and including) 2011 on individual US start-ups
during their early years of operation (see Robb and
Robinson 2014 for a comprehensive discussion of the
capital structure choices of firms covered by this
survey). This information is particularly useful to recon-
struct the sources of financing of these young firms and
allows us to identify amongst others the amounts of
equity owners put in the firm themselves. The survey
also asks questions to the young entrepreneurs. In par-
ticular, to get an idea of the extent of possible problems
to obtain financial resources, we consider the binary
question (yes = 1, 0 otherwise): BWas there any time
when the business needed credit but did not apply
because you or others associated with the business
thought the application would be denied?^We label this
question BFinancial Constraint,^ where a positive
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answer may indicate a firm to be more financially
constraint.1
We collect the data on the amount of equity invested
by the owners for our additional firm’s financing regres-
sions from the same database. The dataset contains
response-adjusted weights (which we use) to minimize
the potential non-response bias in the estimates. From
this database, we construct our measure of the amount of
owners’ equity to total financing, as well as control
variables in the form of firm and main owner character-
istics. We download the various state, MSA, and county
characteristics from the US Census Bureau. We obtain
data on banking establishments per capita also from the
US Census Bureau. This information is available from
2004 to 2009.
The contemporary measure of wealth inequality
looks at the amounts of dividends and interest earned
by US households in 2004, the first year in our sample
period, as reported by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) Statistics of Income (SOI) data. The IRS-SOI data
report the total amount of dividends and interest income
received by US households in a certain zip code. The
information is reported as a total amount per zip code
and is divided into five households’ income groups,
ranging from low income to high income. Under the
assumption that a typical household owns the market
index for stocks and bonds, the amount of financial rents
it receives depends only on the quantity of stocks and
bonds it holds. We use this information to construct a
Gini index of wealth inequality based on financial rents.
Details on its construction are provided in Braggion
et al. (2016).2
Our instrumental variables are based on local weather
patterns. We obtain information from the National Cli-
matic Data Center (NCDC) on local monthly precipita-
tion and temperature (measured in inches and degrees
Fahrenheit, respectively) and their corresponding stan-
dard deviations for the entire period between 1895 and
2003. We then construct simple averages of these series.
The NCDC provides this weather information at the so-
called Bdivisional^ level, i.e., each state is subdivided
into at most 10 divisions that comprised areas that are
known to have similar climatic conditions. We assign
each county to the state division to which it belongs. The
definitions of our variables are provided in Table 1,
whereas the descriptive statistics are presented in
Table 2. Tables 1 and 2 directly provide the list of
control variables we use both at the county and the
individual/entrepreneur level.
4 Results
4.1 Financial constraints
In this section, we present results showing a relationship
between US counties wealth inequality and financial
constraints.
In the first set of results, we measure financial con-
straints by directly looking at the probability that an
entrepreneur renounces to apply for a loan, even if she
needs financing, fearing that she will be turned down.
Table 3 Panel (A), Columns (2)–(6) consider this possi-
bility and we first study the pre-crisis period. Column
(1) shows the results of the first-stage regression for the
IV regressions performed in Table 3. As expected, the
average amount of rainfall and the average temperature
are positively related with wealth inequality. The stan-
dard deviation of rain is negatively related with wealth
inequality that is areas with steadier and more predict-
able rainfalls tend to be more unequal. The standard
deviation of temperature enters with a negative sign
but not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Column 2 shows the results of the OLS regression
where the dependent variable is financial constraints as
previously defined. The coefficient on wealth inequality
is negative and not statistically significant. To move
away from the mere correlations between inequality
and financial constraints that the OLS results provide
to causation, we use an instrumental variable approach.
Columns (3)–(5) present the results of the two-stage
least squares second-stage regressions where wealth
inequality is instrumented with the secular means and
standard deviations of temperature and rainfall. The
coefficient is positive and statistically significant, indi-
cating that in more unequal counties, entrepreneurs are
more likely to renounce to a loan application. In other
words, in more unequal areas, entrepreneurs are more
likely to refrain from applying for bank financing, even
though needed, as they expect that a possible loan
application will be denied. The effect is also economi-
cally sizable: A standard deviation increase in local
wealth inequality increases such probability with around
1 Given that this question is only asked from 2007 onwards, we can
only analyze it for these years.
2 See the internet appendix at the end of the paper.
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Table 1 Variable names, definitions, and data sources for the empirical analysis of firm ownership, financing, and type
Variable name Variable definition Source
Dependent variables
Bank establishments per
capita
The total number of bank establishments per capita in a given county USC
Firm equity The amount of equity invested by the main owners of the business NSF
Financial constraint =1 if a firm answers Byes^ to the question: BWas there any time when the business needed credit but
did not apply because you or others associated with the business thought the application would be
denied?^, =0 otherwise.
KFS
Main independent variables
County inequality in
2004
The Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth as measured by the distribution of the amount of
declared dividends from household tax filings in the county
IRS
MSA inequality in 2004 The Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth as measured by the distribution of the amount of
declared dividends from household tax filings in the metropolitan statistical area (MSA)
IRS
Instrumental variables
Rain The average district precipitation between 1895 and 2003, where a district is defined as a group of
clustered counties with similar climatic conditions
NCDC
Temperature The average district temperature in degrees between 1895 and 2003, where a district is defined as a
group of clustered counties with similar climatic conditions
NCDC
Control variables
Firm characteristics
Firm total assetst-1 The logarithm of one plus total assets, which is the sum of cash, accounts receivable, product inventory,
equipment or machinery, land and buildings, vehicles, other business owned property and other assets
KFS
Firm ROAt-1 Return on Assets, i.e., the amount of net profit divided by total assets winsorized at the 1% level KFS
Firm tangibilityt-1 The amount of property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets KFS
Application
experiencet
=0 if the firm did not apply for credit in a given year, =1 if the firm’s credit applications were always
approved, =2 if they were sometimes approved and sometimes denied, =3 if they were always denied
KFS
Firm number of
ownerst-1
The logarithm of one plus the total number of owners KFS
Main owner characteristics
Main owner is female =1 if main owner is a female, =0 otherwise KFS
Main owner is
African-American
=1 if main owner is African-American, =0 otherwise KFS
Main owner is
Hispanic
=1 if main owner is Hispanic, =0 otherwise KFS
Main owner is Asian =1 if main owner is Asian, =0 otherwise KFS
Main owner is born in
the USA
=1 if main owner was born in the USA, =0 otherwise KFS
Main owner’s work
experience
Number of years of work experience of the main owner in the firm’s industry KFS
County characteristics
County population Total county population at year-end USC
State GDP per capita State GDP dividend by State Population USC
County wage
inequality
The Gini coefficient of the distribution of wages as measured by the distribution of the amount of
labor from household tax filings in the county
IRS
County land area The logarithm of one plus the total county area in square miles at year-end 2000 USC
The table defines the variables used in the empirical analysis of firm ownership, financing and type, and the corresponding data sources used.
Total firm financing is the sum of total debt and equity financing. t-1 indicates that a 1-year lag is used in the empirical analysis. For the sake
of brevity, we do not report the MSA characteristics separately
BEABureau of Economic Analysis, IRS Internal Revenue Service,KFSKauffman Firm Survey,NCDCNational Climatic Data Center,NSF
National Science Foundation, USC US Census
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12.72 percentage points, 73% in respect to its mean. In
Column 6, we consider the time period 2007–2011, the
entire time frame for which information is available on
financial constraints. The coefficient onWealth Inequal-
ity is still positive, but no longer statistically significant:
The introduction of the crisis period weakens the rela-
tionship between inequality and access to finance. We
interpret this result as evidence that during the crises,
banks may have cut credit to all entrepreneurs indepen-
dently of their location. If financial constraints are an
issue for entrepreneurs, we should see that holding
everything else constant, in more unequal counties,
startups are especially financed with entrepreneurs’
own resources. We explore this issue in Table 3 Panel
(B) and start with examining the 2004–2008 period.
Panel B, Column (1) presents the first-stage regression.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable name Number of
observations
Units Mean Standard
deviation
10% Median
(50%)
90%
Dependent variables
Firm equity 17,542 – 0.33 0.40 0.00 0.08 1.00
Financial constraint 12,096 0/1 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00
Bank establishments per capita 18,834 0.49 0.32 0.23 0.40 0.85
Main independent variable
County inequality in 2004 35,757 – 0.85 0.05 0.79 0.85 0.90
Instrumental variables
Rain 22,208 Inch 3.05 1.08 1.35 3.17 4.36
Temperature 20,497 °F 54.89 8.41 45.12 53.02 68.71
Control variables
Firm characteristics
Firm total assets
(natural logarithm)
24,319 (USD) 9.48 3.82 0.00 10.31 13.11
Firm ROA 20,762 – 0.27 2.29 −0.83 0.05 1.67
Firm tangibility 21,769 – 0.56 0.37 0.00 0.64 1.00
Application experiencet 12,094 – 0.18 0.55 0 0 1
Firm number of owners
(natural logarithm)
24,660 – 0.92 0.42 0.69 0.69 1.39
Main owner characteristics
Main owner is female 24,346 0/1 0.26 0.44 0 0 1
Main owner is African-
American
24,553 0/1 0.07 0.26 0 0 0
Main owner is Hispanic 24,553 0/1 0.05 0.21 0 0 0
Main owner is Asian 24,553 0/1 0.04 0.21 0 0 0
Main owner is born in the USA 24,332 0/1 0.90 0.31 0 1 1
Main owner’s work experience 24,336 – 13.51 10.82 1 11 30
State/county characteristics
County population
(natural logarithm)
32,300 – 13.15 1.54 10.98 13.35 15.47
County personal income per
capita
19,432 (USD) 28,315 7562 21,541 26,386 36,260
County wage inequality 35,757 – 0.54 0.03 0.50 0.54 0.58
County land area
(natural logarithm)
24,065 sq mi 14.41 0.66 13.78 14.46 15.06
The table provides the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 10th percentile, the median (50th percentile), and the 90th
percentile of all variables used in the empirical analysis. The definition of the variables is found in Table 1. Due to confidentiality, the
minimum and maximum are not reported
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Like in Panel (A), average rainfall, average temperature,
and standard deviation of rain have the expected sign,
and they are statistically significant. In Column 2, we
consider the OLS where the coefficient on wealth in-
equality is negative and not statistically significant.
Again to move away from correlations to causation,
we perform instrumental variable analyses. Columns
(3)–(5) look at the two-stage least square regressions
during the period 2004–2008. In Column (3), where we
do control for State and Year fixed effects, but not for
county and firms controls, the coefficient on inequality
loads negatively but is not statistically significant at
conventional levels. However, when including a broad
set of firm and county controls as well as various fixed
effects (both state and industry trends, i.e., state * year
and industry * year fixed effects) in both Columns (4)
and (5), the coefficient on wealth inequality enters pos-
itively and it is statistically significant. Again, the eco-
nomic significance is important. A one standard devia-
tion increase in wealth inequality leads to an increase of
entrepreneur’s equity of around 9.96 percentage points,
which is 30% with respect to the mean of the dependent
variable. In Column (6), we consider the full sample:
The coefficient on Wealth inequality is still positive and
marginally statistically significant. The size of the coef-
ficient is, however, very similar to the coefficients we
obtain in the 2004–2008 period.
An interesting outcome of our analysis is that the
OLS estimates always provide a negative relationship
between wealth inequality and our proxies of financial
constraints. Even more importantly, the coefficients re-
lating wealth inequality to financial constraints and
owners’ equity are very small in absolute value with
economic significance close to zero. It appears that
endogeneity biases the coefficients against finding any
result. A possible interpretation is that in more unequal
areas, only very creditworthy individuals become entre-
preneurs. These individuals are more likely to obtain
bank finance, they do not fear to have a loan application
turned down, and they rely less on their own equity to
finance their ventures. As a result, the negative impact
of inequality on the possibility to obtain external finance
is offset by the good creditworthiness of entrepreneurs
in unequal counties. It appears that our instruments
capture the elements of the local institutional environ-
ment that prevent entrepreneurs from accessing bank
finance allowing us to disentangle the negative relation-
ship between inequality and entrepreneurs’ access to
external finance.
4.2 Bank establishments per capita
In an additional analysis, we also check whether in the
aggregate, more wealth inequality leads to a lower sup-
ply of finance. Like in Braggion et al. (2016), we focus
especially on bank finance and we proxy its local supply
with the number of bank establishments per capita by
county. Differently from Braggion et al. (2016), we
explicitly study differential effects of inequality on bank
finance supply before and after the 2008 financial crisis.
We present these results in Table 4. Table 4 Columns
(1)–(3) present the OLS regressions, whereas Columns
(4)–(6) display the 2SLS regressions.3 In all specifica-
tions, wealth inequality alone has a negative and statis-
tically significant coefficient suggesting that bank estab-
lishment per capita is lower in more unequal counties.
The effects are economically important: A standard
deviation increase in inequality leads to a reduction that
ranges between 10 and 30% of the bank establishments
per capita. We also find a negative coefficient on the
interaction term between wealth inequality and the fi-
nancial crisis: The effect of inequality on the supply of
bank capital becomes between 2 and 10% stronger after
the financial crisis. This result suggests that banks
retreated more in counties that displayed higher levels
of wealth inequality: This could have happened either
because of banks failures or because banks divested in
those areas and closed branches. All in all, our results
lend support to the notion that while banks cut credit to
all entrepreneurs, they reduced the amount invested in
their own infrastructure as a result of the crisis, espe-
cially in more unequal counties. This may imply that the
financial crisis may have a longer lasting impact in
unequal counties.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we explored the role of wealth inequality
in explaining financial constraints to entrepreneurs. A
set of studies have indicated wealth inequality as a
possible determinant of inefficient financial markets,
as the wealth elites may distort the development of
capital markets to their own benefits. We focus our
studies on US counties and MSA areas, and as in
Braggion et al. (2016), we constructed local measures
3 We do not report the first stages results in this case, but they look
similar to those reported in Table 3.
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Table 3 The effect of county inequality on financial constraints and firm equity
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable First stage Financial constraints
Panel A: financial constraints
County inequality in 2004 – −0.0489 1.820* 3.659* 3.665* 1.367
– (0.216) (1.003) (2.113) (2.119) (1.864)
County Populationt-1 −0.0033 0.0124 0.0194*** 0.0203 0.0204 0.0180*
(0.001) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Rain 0.0142** – – – – –
(0.006) – – – – –
Rain standard deviation −0.0206** – – – – –
(0.007) – – – – –
Temperature 0.0013* – – – – –
(0.000) – – – – –
Temperature standard deviation −0.0012 – – – – –
(0.001) – – – – –
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable First stage Firm equity
Panel B: firm equity
County inequality in 2004 – −0.0558 −0.362 2.865* 2.916* 2.346
– (0.195) (0.651) (1.768) (1.753) (1.605)
County populationt-1 −0.0029 −0.00189 0.0155*** 0.0103 0.0108 0.00579
(0.001) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Rain 0.0119** – – – – –
(0.006) – – – – –
Rain standard deviation −0.0194*** – – – – –
(0.007) – – – – –
Temperature 0.0013* – – – – –
(0.000) – – – – –
Temperature standard deviation −0.0018 – – – – –
(0.001) – – – – –
County control variables Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Firm control variables Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Two-digit industry fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes No No
State*year fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
Industry*year fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
Number of observations Panel A 3782 4470 4288 3782 3782 8320
Number of observations Panel B 6381 7537 7497 6381 6381 9417
Models (1) and (2) are estimated with a linear regression model (OLS) and take into account cross-sectional Kauffman Firm Survey weights.
Models (3)–(6) are estimatedwith a 2SLS IVmodel for survey data. County inequality in 2004 is instrumentedwith average division rain fall
and temperature between 1895 and 2003 and their corresponding standard deviations. Column (1) reports the first-stage regression. The
definition of the variables can be found in Table 1. t-1 indicates a 1-year lag. The results in Panel A do not include the years 2004–2006 since
the constraint variable is not available for these years. BYes^ indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. BNo^ indicates that the set of
fixed effects is not included. B–^ indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
*Significance at 10% level
**Significance at 5% level
***Significance at 1% level
Evidence from the Kauffman Firm Survey
of wealth inequality by looking at the local distribution
of financial rents.We find that in more unequal counties,
entrepreneurs are more likely to renounce to apply to a
loan even if in need of finance because they fear to be
turned down. Moreover, in more unequal counties, the
proportion of owners’ equity in startup financing is
higher. We also find that in more unequal areas, the
supply of bank capital, measured as bank establishments
per capita, is especially negative after the 2007–2008
financial crisis.
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